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Abstract 
 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) aim at protecting depositors of all credit institutions against bank 
failures. One of the most critical issues about DGS concerns the criteria to be used to assess the 
risk‐based contribution that each member bank should pay to the Scheme. We propose an alternative 
model for risk-based contributions based on CDS spreads. We construct the same balance sheet ratios 
used in the Italian DGSs for a sample of EU banks issuing CDSs. Subsequently we perform panel 
regressions to explore the relationship between CDS spreads and balance sheet indicators. Results are 
used to construct an Aggregate Indicator of bank riskiness that is compared with the Aggregate 
Indicator currently used in the analyzed DGS.  
 
Keywords: Deposit Guarantee Schemes, Credit Default Swaps, bank risk, balance sheet ratios.  
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1. Introduction 
Deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) are the part of the financial safety net designed to offer protection 
to depositors and consequently support the stability of the entire economy. DGSs ensure depositors 
that, in the event of a bank’s failure, they will be able to recover at least a proportion of their deposits. 
They are not intended to deal by themselves with systemic crises generated by the failure of 
systemically important banks, but need to be part of a well-designed financial system safety net where 
all the participants work together and cooperate . 
As explained in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), bank runs occur when depositors rush to withdraw their 
deposits because they expect a bank to fail. Bank runs are caused by a combination of two factors (see 
Ketcha, 2007): first the illiquidity of bank loans — the primary asset of banks —that means it is 
impossible to sell loans quickly without a loss in value. Second, the possibility for depositors to 
withdraw their deposits on demand or at short notice. Moreover, the ‘first come, first served’ nature of 
the process provides depositors with the incentive to run. A bank suffering a panic run will liquidate 
many of its assets at a loss and this will lead to its failure. DGSs are an instrument in the financial 
safety net implemented to avoid bank runs by maintaining a high level of public confidence in banks’ 
ability to meet their obligations. For doing so DGSs need some funding or financial contributions from 
banks. 
Design of DGSs varies across countries. Differences are mainly driven by choices related to funding 
mechanisms: ex post and ex ante funding can be combined with risk-based or non risk-based 
contributions. Banks’ risk-based contributions to DGSs are adjusted according to an evaluation of the 
riskiness of the financial institutions that have to contribute. The existence of DGSs give rise to moral 
hazard problems since guarantees push banks towards an increasing risk taking attitude. Nevertheless 
some recent papers highlight the important role risk-based contributions have in mitigating moral 
hazard problem by inducing a more prudent behaviour of banks and by improving their risk 
management (see European Commission Impact Assessment, 2010; Schich, 2008 and Ketcha, 2007).  
Techniques used to compute risk-based contributions for DGSs mainly differ along three dimensions: 
the identification of banks’ risk profiles, the selection of indicators able to represent those profiles and 
the aggregation methodologies used to combine them in a single index representing the overall banks’ 
riskiness. 
Once significant firms’ profiles to be measures are identified, indicators that are able to summarize 
them can be recovered looking at three different sources: external credit ratings, accounting data and 
market prices. 
In recent years, credit ratings have been widely criticized for their poor discriminatory power in the 
identification of insolvent financial institutions (recall for example the not prompt downgrade of 
Lehman Brothers, Freddie Mac and Enron).  
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In this paper we focus on CAMEL models based both on accounting variables and market values. The 
CAMEL model developed in 1980s by US supervisory authorities is the most known example of risk 
rating models based on accounting variables. In the CAMEL framework, each banking institution is 
evaluated on the basis of five basic balance sheet indicators revealing single banks’ operations and 
performance, namely: Capital adequacy, Assets quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity (see 
Sahajwala and Van den Bergh, 2000 for details). A composite rating is then constructed that represents 
a bank’s current financial condition. Our analysis is developed taking into account the model currently 
adopted at the Italian DGS, that uses similar accounting variables. Market prices (stocks, bonds  and 
CDS ) can represent an additional source of information since they may efficiently summarize the state 
of health of those firms they are referred to.  
CAMEL models that aim at assigning a risk score to financial institutions generally aggregate selected 
indicators in order to produce a single indicator of bank riskiness. The aggregation procedure of each 
ratios (by weighs) is mainly based on subjective choices that are not derived from empirical/statistical 
evidence.  
Our contribution presents a new methodology to construct risk-based contributions, based on the 
relationship between balance sheet indicators and CDS spreads. In particular, we propose an indicator 
of banks’ riskiness starting from accounting variables that are aggregated using their relative 
importance in explaining market variables (CDS spreads).   
Banks CDSs are an assessment of the (credit) riskiness of issuers, so they can be employed as a 
benchmark for the calculation of any risk-based contribution to a general DGS. This paper uses CDS 
spreads data as a dependent variable in regressions having balance sheet indicators currently employed 
in the Italian DGS as independent variables. In this way the risk indicator is bechmarked to the market 
evaluation of riskiness in the banking system.  
Literature on CDSs is relatively scarce since the CDS market enjoyed a significant increase in traded 
volumes only from 2004. Moreover, only a limited number of existing papers specifically examine 
CDS spreads in the banking sector and, among them, only one (Chiaramonte and Casu, 2010) 
investigates the relationship between CDS spreads and balance sheet indicators confirming that CDS 
spreads reflect the risk captured by bank balance sheet ratios. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: the next section contains a brief revision of the literature 
about CDS and DGSs. Section 3 contains the description of the methodology used to construct the 
alternative model based on CDS spreads. Data and results are discussed in sections 4 and 5 whereas 
conclusions and further developments are presented in section 6. 
2. Literature review 
A CDS is a type of credit derivative designed to isolate the risk of default on credit obligations. 
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Credit derivatives are in general conceived to hedge, transfer, or manage credit risk and therefore they 
can be thought of as insurance against default. Two counterparties are involved, the protection buyer 
and the protection seller. The insured event is the loss arising from a default, the premium paid is the 
fee, and the maximum covered loss is called the notional amount (see Stulz, 2009). As explained in 
Cariboni et al. (2009), the idea is that credit risk is transferred without reallocating the ownership of 
the underlying asset. 
CDSs take up a very large share of the credit derivatives market. They trade over the counter on a 
dealers’ market where dealers trade with end-users as well as with other dealers. A CDS is a bilateral 
agreement whereby the protection buyer transfers the credit risk of a reference entity to the protection 
seller for a specified length of time. The buyer of the protection makes predetermined payments to the 
seller until either the maturity date is reached or the default event occurs. In the latter case, the 
protection buyer pays the protection seller a specified amount. The CDS spread is the yearly rate paid 
by the protection buyer to enter the contract against the default of the reference entity. Thus, it reflects 
the riskiness of the underlying credit. 
Literature on CDSs started to grow from 2004, when the size of the CDS market became significantly 
large. It is divided into two strands: papers dedicated to the pricing characteristics of CDS spreads and 
papers focusing on the determinants of CDS spreads. 
In the first group there are empirical analyses investigating the ability of CDS spreads to incorporate 
firm-specific information. Some empirical studies (see for example Blanco et al., 2005) prove the 
superiority of CDS spreads over corporate bond spreads in terms of price discovery: it has been shown 
that information mostly flows from CDS prices to bond prices. 
Models for determinants of credit spread risk are usually classified into two categories: structural 
models and reduced form models.  
Before the surge of the CDS market, empirical studies looking for the determinants of credit risk were 
based only on corporate spreads. Elton et al. (2001), Driessen (2005) and Amato and Remolona (2005) 
focus on the ‘credit spread puzzle’, trying to explain why historical default losses are not aligned with 
observed credit premia. A second group of empirical studies tries to identify determinants of credit 
spreads in a statistical way by regressing observed spreads on factors identified by theoretical models 
as explanatory variables (see for example Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001; Campbell and Taksler, 2003; 
Guazzarotti, 2004; Avramov et al., 2007; Cremers et al., 2004). 
The first papers focusing on the determinants of CDS spreads suggest that, in addition to credit risk, 
CDS spreads reflect some other factors. For example, Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002) focus on contracts 
that were traded between January 1998 and February 2000 (with both sovereign and corporate 
underlying assets) to investigate the influence of some fundamental variables on a cross-section of 
credit default transaction data. They find that ratings, asset volatility, the size and direction of stock 
 10 
price changes and leverage together with market information are able to explain up to 82 % of the 
variation in CDS pricing. More recent papers consider only bank CDS spreads in order to test whether 
those factors that determine CDS spread in non-financial institutions remain valid also for the banking 
sector. Almer et al. (2008) work on daily EUR-denominated CDS quotes relating to financial 
institutions during the period January 2001 – December 2007. Firstly, they show that short-term (six-
month) and long-term (five-year) spreads have a high correlation during the whole period. Dividing 
the analysis into sub-periods, they find that in periods of turbulence spreads have the tendency to co-
move; in calm markets they seem independent. They also seek to identify factors that drive short- 
and/or long-term CDS spreads. Annaert et al. (2009) perform an empirical analysis of the determinants 
of CDS spread changes for 31 listed Euro-area banks over the period January 2004 – October 2008. 
They find three main results: first, the determinants of changes in bank CDS spreads exhibit significant 
time variation. Second, variables suggested by structural credit risk models (risk-free interest rate, 
leverage and asset volatility) are not significant in explaining bank CDS spread changes, both in the 
period prior to the crisis and in the crisis period itself. However, some of the variables proxying for 
business conditions, market conditions and uncertainty  are significant, but both the magnitude and the 
sign of coefficients have changed over time. Third, CDS market liquidity became a significant factor 
in explaining bank CDS spread changes when the crisis broke out in the summer of 2007. 
Chiaramonte and Casu (2010) investigate the relationship between balance sheet ratios and CDS 
spreads in three periods: pre-crisis (January 2005 – June 2007), crisis (July 2007 – March 2009) and 
during-and-post-crisis (April 2009 – March 2010). This is the first paper that uses specifically balance 
sheet information to explain variations in CDS spreads. More particularly, they analyse the following 
explanatory variables: Asset quality; Capital; Profitability; Liquidity. Their sample is composed of 57 
international banks (43 of which are European). They find that both in the pre-crisis and — in 
particular — in the crisis periods bank CDS spreads reflect the risk captured by balance sheet ratios. 
But significant explanatory variables are different in the three sub-periods considered. In particular, the 
ratio of loan loss reserve to gross loans is the only significant variable in all three periods. Both 
leverage and the Tier 1 ratio are never among the determinants of CDS spreads and, finally, liquidity 
does not explain CDS spreads in the pre-crisis period. 
Some other papers focusing on the banking sector analyze CDS spreads in order to explain details of 
the current financial crisis. Eichengreen et al. (2009) investigate common components driving the 
variance of CDS spreads before and during the crisis. Calice and Ioannidis (2009) focus on the group 
of large complex financial institutions (LCFIs) as defined by the Bank of England (2001). They find 
that CDS indices in Europe and the US are important in explaining the movement in LCFIs’ equity 
prices, as are credit fundamentals. Additionally, they find robust short-run evidence of an overall 
increase in correlations across these two markets since the middle of 2007. Huang et al. (2008) propose 
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a framework for measuring and stress-testing the systemic risk of a group of major financial 
institutions. CDS spreads are used together with equity prices of individual banks in order to construct 
an indicator of systemic risk in the banking sector. Hart and Zingales (2009) use CDS spreads to 
design a new capital requirement for large financial institutions (LFIs) that are too big to fail.  
The present contribution starts from the paper by Chiaramonte and Casu (2010), which provides 
evidence of the close relationship between CDS spreads and information contained in banks’ balance 
sheets. Their work, together with preceding contributions focusing on determinants of CDS spreads, 
highlights the fact that CDS spreads represent not only credit risk, but the more general state of health 
of the financial institutions concerned. 
3. Methodology 
As a first step, the explanatory power of the Italian model is investigated by using sensitivity analysis 
(SA) tools. 
The first-order sensitivity index (also known in literature as Pearson’s correlation ratio or main effect), 
iS , is an appealing measure of importance of a variable for several reasons (Paruolo et al., 2011): 
 it offers a precise definition of importance, namely ‘the expected reduction in variance of the 
composite indicator that would be obtained if a variable could be fixed’; 
 it is always positive, which makes it interpretable in all cases; 
 it can be used regardless of the degree of correlation between variables; 
 it is ‘model-free’, which means that it can be applied in principle also in non-linear 
aggregations, unlike the effective weights or the Pearson correlation coefficient that are 
constrained by the linear assumption; and finally 
 it is not invasive, which means that no changes are made to the composite indicator or to the 
correlation structure of the indicators. This is contrasted with the technique of eliminating one 
indicator at a time in order to assess its impact on the final ranking. 
Here SA is employed to test the importance of the variables by a commonly used variance-based 
measure iS  (see Saltelli and Tarantola, 2002) also known in literature as Pearson’s correlation ratio or  
first-order sensitivity index.  
iS  is defined as follows: 
)(
))((
YV
XYEV
S
iiXX
i
i     (1) 
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the ratio between ))(( iiXX XYEV i  , the expected reduction in variance of the composite indicator by 
fixing a variable, and the unconditional variance, ( )V Y . 
In order to compute iS  we can transform the problem by the following: 
))(())(( iiiiXX XfVXYEV i 
1 
As to say, ))(( iiXX XYEV i   can be estimated by an appropriate interpolation and smoothing algorithm 
applied to a simple scatter plot of the composite indicator Y’s scores versus any variable iX . 
In the simple case where f(i) is a linear function, iS  reduces to 
2
iR  the square of Pearson’s correlation 
between Y and iX .  
Note that this smoothing approach is but one of many possible strategies to estimate the values of iS . 
In Paruolo et al. (2011), kernel regression is used, while other modelling applications are based on 
design points (see Saltelli et al., 2010 for a review). Our estimations are based on the non-parametric 
multivariate smoothing approach in Ratto and Pagano (2010), called state-dependent regression, that is 
equivalent to smoothing splines and kernel regression but is performed using a recursive algorithm to 
identify relevant ANOVA terms2.  
As a second step, we investigated if basic accounting ratios statistically explain the CDS variance. For 
doing so, we estimated the relationship between five-year CDS spreads for 48 European banks and 
FITD balance sheet ratios constructed for the same sample of banks is investigated. The regression is 
performed on the following model: 
 jtjtjt xCDS    
where j represents the individual bank, and t indicates the time periods. The explanatory variables 
involved are the four bank balance sheet ratios used by the Italian DGS: A1, B1, D1, D2.  
More specifically, 
• A1 represents the risk profile. It is constructed as the ratio between bad loans and supervisory 
capital; 
• B1 investigates the solvency profile, represented by the ratio between the supervisory capital 
(including Tier 3) and supervisory capital requirements; 
• D1 and D2 represent the profitability profile. D1 is the cost to income ratio and D2 is the ratio 
between loan losses (net of recoveries) and profit before tax. 
                                                 
1 
See Paruolo et al. (2011). 
2
 See Ratto and Pagano (2010). 
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Regressions are firstly conducted over the period 2006-2010, and then over the core (European) crisis 
period 2008-2010. Bank CDS spreads do not react in advance to the crisis and require less than a 
three-month lag to incorporate the balance sheet information. Thus, we run regressions with both bank 
CDS spreads and balance sheet variables at time t, as in Chiaramonte and Casu (2010). 
As a second step,if the regressors of CDs model are statistically significant, the beta coefficients found 
in the regressions performed in the previous step are kept and an indicator of bank riskiness is 
constructed that represents an alternative to the one used in the Italian framework. 
The last step consists in comparing the performance of the current Italian model with the performance 
associated with the new indicator constructed using CDS spreads. The comparison reveals a common 
trend in the two indicators during the period 2006-2010 with some interesting differences. 
3.1 Bank CDS spreads 
European banking groups associated with five-year CDS spreads are considered. The limited number 
of banks contained in the sample (48) derives from the decision to focus on the banking sector within 
EU countries. Banks are distributed among European countries as follows: 
 
Table 1 Number of banking groups per country 
Country
3
 AT BE DE DK ES FR GB GR IE IT NL PT SE 
Number of 
banks 
3 2 8 1 3 4 7 1 3 8 4 2 2 
 
The analysis is divided into two periods: 2006-2010 and 2008-2010. Daily spreads coming from 
Bloomberg were available from January 2006 to December 2010 for the 48 banks. The average spread 
over the last 15 days of December of each year considered was taken since only annual data were 
available for balance sheet variables. 
The following table shows average annual CDS spreads by country: 
Table 2 Annual average CDS spreads per country 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
AT 0.0018 0.0077 0.0360 0.0232 0.0286 
BE na na 0.0463 0.0207 0.0346 
DE 0.0020 0.0090 0.0166 0.0163 0.0335 
DK 0.0008 0.0054 0.0229 0.0129 0.0191 
ES 0.0017 0.0090 0.0262 0.0175 0.0494 
FR 0.0010 0.0070 0.0272 0.0160 0.0237 
GB 0.0009 0.0075 0.0218 0.0121 0.0205 
GR na na na 0.0409 0.1451 
IE 0.0011 0.0149 0.0427 0.0529 0.2414 
IT 0.0010 0.0065 0.0413 0.0122 0.0276 
NL 0.0010 0.0067 0.0999 0.0229 0.0280 
PT 0.0015 0.0080 0.0170 0.0169 0.1312 
SE 0.0021 0.0022 0.0187 0.0097 0.0112 
                                                 
3 AT=Austria, BE=Belgium, DE=Germany, DK=Denmark, ES=Spain, FR=France, GB=UK, GR=Greece, IE=Ireland, IT=Italy, NL=The 
Netherlands, PT=Portugal, SE=Sweden. 
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Average 0.0014 0.0082 0.0387 0.0198 0.0529 
 
Values of average spreads are quite different among countries, ranging from a minimum value of 
0.0014 in 2006 to a maximum of 0.0529 in 2010 (driven by high Greek and Irish values). The highest 
values are associated with Greece (only two years of available data) and Ireland, as expected. 
3.2 Balance sheet ratios 
Data about Italian banks are public data provided by FastBilanci. 
The change in accounting methots due to introduction of International Accounting Standards at the end 
of 2005 do not allow to use data for the previous years, only from 2006 we have fully comparable 
balance sheet extractions.  
The analysis involves all the FITD’s member banks (around 300), which represent over 90 % of total 
eligible deposits as of June 2010 (693.5 billion €). This means that the dataset draws a complete 
picture of the Italian banking system. More specifically, the dataset contains 263 banks in 2006, 265 in 
2007, 252 in 2008, 240 in 2009 and 208 in 2010. The original dataset was reduced by eliminating 
banks that benefit from exceptions (start-up banks, non-EU banks from G10 countries and banks with 
no reimbursable funds).  
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 3: 
Table 3 Average values. Italian banks sample, 2006-2010 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
A1 7.57 7.77 9.19 12.82 17.47 
B1 271.13 304.84 285.60 266.67 252.45 
D1 62.00 63.17 72.87 82.70 80.47 
D2 -1.38 13.01 -0.41 67.20 -196.80 
Looking at annual average values, we notice a deterioration of ratios. In particular, A1 increases, B1 
drops starting from 2007 and D1 increases until 2009. D2 doesn’t show a clear tendency because of the 
large variability in D2 data. Its negative average values are driven by extreme negative values in the 
sample. Subsequently to the application of a winsoring procedure, D2 shows an increasing trend until 
2009, which is consistent with the higher riskiness showed by the other indicators. 
Table 4 provides details about correlations between indicators in the FITD sample. Correlation 
coefficients are computed both for 2006-2010 and for 2008-2010. 
 
Table 4 Correlation coefficients between balance sheet ratios, FITD sample 
 2006-2010 2008-2010 
 A1 B1 D1 D2 A1 B1 D1 D2 
A1 1    1    
B1 -25 % 1   -32 % 1   
D1 2 % 18 % 1  -1 % 29 % 1  
D2 -5 % 0 % -2 % 1 -6 % 0 % -3 % 1 
The four ratios are slightly correlated to each other, confirming that indicators are capturing different 
risk profiles, and their aggregation could offer a spread picture of banks’ exposures. The largest 
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correlation values are represented by the correlations between B1 and A1 (-25 %) and between B1 and 
D1 (18 %). Such a behaviour is confirmed looking specifically at the central crisis period. Larger 
values are obtained considering D2 without extreme values. 
The second sample of banks is composed of the 48 European banking groups issuing CDSs. The 
dataset contains 25 banking groups in 2006, 30 in 2007, 33 in 2008, 37 in 2009 and 40 in 2010.  
Balance sheet ratios are computed using Bankscope™, a database containing balance sheet data for 
banks worldwide. The table below sets out average values for the sample of banks issuing CDSs. 
 
Table 5 Balance sheet ratios average values, Bankscope sample, 2006-2010 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
A1 19.64 22.31 45.22 51.67 61.38 
B1 140.45 136.26 140.34 166.55 181.87 
D1 58.99 61.03 76.96 61.64 65.16 
D2 119.71 377.75 -12.66 858.51 316.15 
 
Comparing Table 3 to Table 5, the two samples differs in value range, but the tendency towards a 
deterioration of balance sheet ratios moving from 2006 to 2010 is confirmed. 
Table 6 reports the correlation matrix  for the Bankscope sample. 
 
Table 6 Correlation coefficients between balance sheet ratios, Bankscope sample 
 2006-2010 2008-2010 
 A1 B1 D1 D2 A1 B1 D1 D2 
A1 1    1    
B1 -4 % 1   -12 % 1   
D1 6 % 25 % 1  2 % 23 % 1  
D2 6 % -3 % -9 % 1 4 % -4 % -5 % 1 
 
Bold numbers signals the main differences with the previous correlation table. In particular, 
throughout the considered time period A1 and B1 display a slight negative correlation, whose 
magnitude increases significantly considering only the central period. This difference was not so 
definite in the previous sample. Moreover, the correlation between D2 and A1 (in 2006-2010 and 
2008-2010) has a different sign than in the FITD data. If we consider D2 without extreme values, 
differences in signs still remain, at least in the period 2008-2010. 
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4. Results 
4.1 Sensitivity anaysis  
Sensitivity analysis results are reported here following both in graphical and numerical terms.  
The scatter plots in Figure 1 graphically show the relationship between the composite indicator (AI) 
and the sources of uncertainty (ratios) over the period 2006-2010. 
In order to avoid the plots being influenced by extreme values, both the left and the right 2.5% of the 
distribution extremes of the distributions were replaced with the nearest “non extreme” value. 
 
Figure 1 Scatter plots for A1, B1, D1 and D2 vs Aggregate Index 
 
 
The second scatterplot show that B1 has a rather flat behaviour, meaning that the aggregate indicator is 
not relevantly affected by movements in B1, while the other figures show a more clear pattern, giving 
evidence of their relative importance in the variability of the composite indicators. All of them have a 
rather monotonic behaviour, except for D2, which shows non-monotonicity coherently with its 
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peculiar definition: a bank is considered riskier either when D2 is negative or it takes large positive 
values.    
For the numerical analysis, first-order sensitivity indices for the four ratios calculated using the 
algorithm of Ratto and Pagano (2010) are computed for evaluating the influence of each variable to the 
aggregate index.  Sensitivity indices are reported presented in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Sensitivity indices for A1, B1, D1 and D2. FITD sample, 2006-2010 
 
Sensitivity index 
A1 0.4096 
B1 0.0885 
D1 0.4904 
D2 0.7458 
 
Results confirm that B1 lacks of informative power. Furthermore, the important role given to A1 by its 
double weight is not confirmed by its sensitivity index, which is even lower than the one associated 
with profitability ratios. 
4.2 Relationship between CDS spreads and balance sheet ratios used at the FITD in a sample composed of 48 
European banks issuing CDSs 
To determine whether CDS spreads can be explained by balance sheet ratios, a regression was 
performed, in which the explanatory variables are represented by balance sheet ratios and the 
dependent variable is the CDS spread, as shown in the equation below: 
 jtjtjt xCDS    
Regressions were conducted over the sample of 48 EU banking groups, for which the four FITD ratios 
were constructed using Bankscope data. 
As a first step, two regressions were performed over the entire period 2006-2010: one regression 
includes the four FITD ratios and the second one includes also a dummy variable that identifies the last 
three years, these being the most turbulent years according to CDS values (we can call them the core 
crisis period). Subsequently regressions were run specifically on those three years. For all the 
regressions the final sample consists of 165 observations for 48 banks (years with missing data were 
eliminated).The results are set out in Table 8: 
 
Table 8 Regressions results, Bankscope sample 
 2006-2010 2006-2010 with dummy 2008-2010 
A1 
0.0455
*** 
(0.0054) 
0.0413
*** 
(0.0053) 
0.0442
*** 
(0.0066) 
B1 
0.0056
 
(0.0049) 
-0.00055
 
(0.0048) 
0.0064
 
(0.0062) 
D1 
-0.00062
 
(0.0112) 
-0.00208
 
(0.0169) 
0.0049
 
(0.0141) 
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D2 
-0.00018 
(0.00016) 
-0.0002
* 
(0.00016) 
-0.00017 
(0.0002) 
Dummy 
 1.862
*** 
(0.0068) 
 
    
Number of observations 165 165 110 
Number of banks in the sample 48 48 48 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4623 0.4813 0.4807 
 
The dependent variable is CDS spreads, which is strictly related to the probability of default. 
Explanatory variables are four balance sheet ratios referring to risk (A1), solvency (B1) and 
profitability (D1 and D2). Standard errors of estimated coefficients are in brackets below the estimated 
coefficient; *** denotes coefficients statistically different from zero (1 %, 2.5 %, 5 % levels) 
Results show that A1 is the most significant variable. The high explanatory power of A1 was expected 
since it is focused on credit risk, and CDSs are strictly linked to that specific banking risk. B1 is only 
significant at the 20 % level and the introduction of the dummy makes its significance level further 
decreasing. D1 is never significantly different from zero (the t-statistic ranges from -0.055 in the first 
regression to 0.349 in the regression with the dummy). Since D2 has non-monotonic behaviour, new 
regressions are performed after replacing D2 negative values with the 95th percentile of its 
distribution. 
 
Table 9 Regressions results after modification of D2. Bankscope sample 
 2006-2010 2006-2010 with dummy 2008-2010 
A1 
0.0469
*** 
(0.0055) 
0.0428
*** 
(0.0055) 
0.046
*** 
(0.0067) 
B1 
0.00522
 
(0.0049) 
-0.0015
 
(0.0053) 
0.0061
 
(0.0061) 
D1 
0.0015
 
(0.017) 
0.0005
 
(0.0111) 
0.0081
 
(0.0142) 
D2 
-0.00027
 
(0.00018) 
-0.0003
* 
(0.00018) 
-0.0003
 
(0.0002) 
Dummy  
2.009
*** 
(0.7058) 
 
    
Number of observations 165 165 110 
Number of banks in the sample 48 48 48 
Adjusted R-squared 0.465 0.487 0.487 
 
The modification of D2 slightly increases its significance (it is always significant at the 10 % level, 
and it reaches significance at 5 % only in the regression with the dummy). Still, there are not large 
differences between the two regression results. 
Looking at the results the following observations can be made: 
• A1, which represents the credit risk profile, is the ratio mostly connected to CDS spreads. So, a 
DGS system that wants to emphasize the bank’s capacity to face losses without becoming insolvent 
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should give more importance to this ratio. The choice of the Italian DGS to assign more importance to 
A1 through a double coefficient is coherent with this. 
• B1 loses importance with the introduction of a dummy variable identifying the most turbulent 
crisis period. Without the dummy variable, B1 is significant at the 20 % level (with and without the 
modification of D2). 
• D1 is not significantly different from zero. In the first set of regressions, the sign of its 
relationship with CDS spreads doesn’t emerge clearly. The introduction of a modified version of D2 
doesn’t changes its significance. Even if this ratio measures the same bank profile as D2 
(efficiency/profitability), it cannot be discarded from the analysis. The low correlations between D1 
and D2 evidence that the two ratios do not measure the same riskiness profile. Further research on this 
ratio is needed. 
• D2 has a non-monotonic behavior that calls for a partial modification. By design, high riskiness is 
measured either by negative values (thanks to the denominator) or by large positive values. After 
modifying the variable, transforming the negative values into positive values that represent the 95th 
percentile of D2’s distribution, D2 is always significant at the 10 % level and at the 5 % level with the 
introduction of the dummy variable. Nevertheless, regression coefficients always have a negative sign, 
which was not expected. 
• The four ratios explain about 48 % of CDS spreads. This result confirms what was found by 
previous literature: CDS spreads are strictly connected with balance sheet ratios. For this reason, they 
can be used as a benchmark for composite indicators intended to represent banks’ riskiness. 
• The choice of balance sheet ratios needs to be better explored. Taking into account previous 
literature, it emerges that liquidity and leverage are not considered in the current Italian model.  
The present contribution aims to propose a critical approach to existing DGSs: comparing current 
approaches using balance sheet ratios with quantities priced on the market is useful to gain an idea of 
what kind of situation is actually measured. 
Considering the regression coefficients presented earlier, it is possible to construct an aggregated 
indicator of banking riskiness for the 48 EU banks issuing CDSs and using the same coefficient to 
construct another indicator for the FITD sample. 
4.3 Correction of (Italian) bank riskiness indicator using regression coefficients found in the previous step. 
Comparison of the performance of the new indicators with the current indicator applied in the Italian DGS 
The coefficients found in the first and second group of regressions for the whole period 2006-2010 
were selected and an aggregate indicator was constructed for bank riskiness. 
Coefficients were chosen taking into account the magnitude of the four coefficients found in the above 
regressions. When D2 is modified to eliminate negative values, the coefficient associated with D1 
changes its sign. The two aggregate indicators are constructed for the sample composed of 48 EU 
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banks and two series are obtained that exhibit a correlation with the CDS spread series of, respectively, 
55% and 56%. The average values of the two aggregate indicators over the five years considered show 
a clear increasing trend, as CDS spreads. Applying the same weights for the four indicators 
constructed for the FITD sample yields the following values: 
 
Table 10 Annual average values of aggregate indicators over 2006-2010. FITD sample 
 Average values 
 AI AI with D2 modified 
2006 328.641 332.948 
2007 363.187 368.163 
2008 355.499 359.994 
2009 361.702 368.425 
2010 398.036 392.298 
 
The increasing trend is evident also taking the FITD sample, with the exception of 2008, when there is 
a decrease in average values. 
The following table highlights the behaviour of new aggregate indicators in the six classes of risk 
identified by the aggregate indicator currently used at the FITD. 
 
Table 11 Annual average values of the new aggregate indicator in the six risk classes identified by the aggregate indicator 
currently used at the FITD. FITD sample, 2006-2010 
 Average AI 
Risk classes 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Normal 316.058 320.280 330.506 332.971 358.122 
Attention 358.214 534.453 388.798 376.513 332.632 
Warning 300.894 277.504 390.245 346.656 389.634 
Penalty 428.445 513.517 426.075 396.660 462.995 
Severe imbalance 529.237 267.311 431.414 538.230 775.293 
Expulsion - 541.097 644.949 747.514 719.131 
Tot. average 328.641 363.187 355.499 361.702 398.036 
 
Table 12 Annual average values of the new aggregate indicator (obtained with D2 modified) in the six risk classes 
identified by the aggregate indicator currently used at the FITD. FITD sample, 2006-2010 
 Average AI (with D2 modified) 
Risk classes 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Normal 321.542 325.703 336.332 339.197 364.701 
Attention 361.202 539.048 394.819 386.692 339.174 
Warning 307.755 282.497 397.705 353.890 397.012 
Penalty 419.983 514.861 423.124 400.384 464.905 
Severe imbalance 528.697 274.060 399.484 545.874 403.320 
Expulsion - 549.141 653.367 762.018 628.146 
Tot. average 332.948 368.163 359.994 368.425 392.298 
 
It is clear from the above results that both the new aggregate indicators exhibit an increasing trend 
along the six risk classes. The AI rises in the six risk classes with the exception of 2007, when both 
AIs show fluctuating behaviour. A closer look at original data reveals that such behaviour is caused by 
the ratio B1, which in 2007 takes on really extreme (positive) values for ten banks, probably because 
of the beginning of the crisis. In particular, averages are influenced by extremes in the Normal, 
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Attention and Penalty classes that for this reason take on really high values. The exclusion of extreme 
values for B1 allows an increasing trend to be obtained also for the year 2007. For the same reason the 
annual average values do not increase monotonically: the large rise in 2007 is driven by the ten 
extreme values of B1. 
The behaviour of annual average values of the new AI shows that the current Italian model and the AI 
derived from CDSs go in the same direction. This is not so evident looking at minimum and maximum 
values of new aggregate indicators: they do not rise univocally along risk classes and they show huge 
variability. 
 
5. Conclusions 
We analysed risk-based contributions to DGSs based on the relationship between balance sheet ratios 
and CDS spreads during the period 2006-2010, considering the four balance sheet ratios currently 
employed at the Italian DGS, and evaluated for 48 EU banks issuing CDS.  
Regressions reveal that only three out of four ratios have some explanatory power. In particular, the 
ratio that refers to banks’ risk profile is always significant in explaining CDS spreads.  
In a second step we construct an aggregate index representing banks’ riskiness by applying regression 
coefficients to the sample of Italian banks available at the Italian DGS. The comparison between the 
average values of both the new aggregate index and the one currently adopted reveals that they are 
coherent at least in the extreme risk classes (low risk and high risk).   
Results confirmes that CDS spreads are strictly connected to balance sheet ratios, in line whit what 
was pointed out by previous literature, so that these ratios and aggregate indicators could be employed 
in DGSs procedures to proxy the risk actually priced on the market.  
Our analysis also suggest that some points are worth to be better addressed in future research. In 
particular, the different characteristics the two samples exhibit can be related to the different 
dimension of the considered banks: banks issuing CDSs are typically top-tier banking groups, whereas 
the sample of Italian banks is mainly composed by individual banks of small dimensions. This point 
should be better addressed, together with a more close assessment of the adequacy of the ratios used at 
FITD. More, Additional ratios that exhibit a possible explanatory power of CDS spreads must be 
investigated, in order to find if different variables can improve the banks riskiness approximation. 
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